



Kwibuka
remember - unite - renew

30

**THE HISTORY OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE
AGAINST TUTSI IN RWANDA**

A SUMMARIZED GUIDING
BOOKLET

THE HISTORY OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI IN RWANDA

A SUMMARIZED GUIDING
BOOKLET



INTRODUCTION

The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi took the lives of more than a million Rwandans. The Genocide was organized and executed in full view of the international community, which stood idle and watched as it unfolded.

The Genocide was not an accident, but rather a culmination of a decades-old, divisive, ethnicity-based ideology of hatred. These divisions began during the colonial period in Rwanda and ultimately resulted in the planning of the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, carried out by President Juvénal Habyarimana's National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) regime.

The Genocide was put to an end by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)-Inkotanyi in July 1994. Rwanda's reconstruction journey started with the establishment of the Government of National Unity, which made unity and reconciliation the cornerstones of the new Rwanda.

Despite tremendous achievements in the three decades since the tragedy, Rwanda still faces Genocide denial.

Education about the Genocide is one of the most important ways to keep the memory of the victims alive. It is important to reflect on the root causes and consequences of the Genocide so that not only Rwandans, but the world at large, take the necessary measures to punish the crime of genocide and prevent it from happening again.

This booklet was developed as a tool to assist in delivering educational programs about the Genocide. It includes referral documents that can be consulted for additional useful information to complement the booklet when providing lecture sessions.

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION	3
CHAPTER 1: THE COLONIAL RWANDA	5
1. Brief overview of pre-colonial Rwanda	5
2. Colonial rule and the destruction of the Rwandan identity	6
3. The Rupture between the colonial administration and the Tutsi elite	10
4. The establishment of political parties in 1959	11
CHAPTER 2: POST-COLONIAL RWANDA (1962-1994)	13
1. Characteristics of Rwanda under the First Republic (1962-1973) and Second Republic (1973-1994)	13
2. Preparation of the Genocide against the Tutsi	18
CHAPTER 3 EXECUTION OF THE GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI	29
1. The international recognition of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi	30
2. The international community's responsibility	31
CHAPTER 4	33
DENIAL OF GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI	33
CONCLUSION	39
SOURCES AND REFERENCE MATERIALS	40
DOCUMENTARY FILMS	45

THE COLONIAL RWANDA

1. Brief overview of pre-colonial Rwanda

Pre-colonial Rwanda was structured around the nation's shared cultural values and customs designed to sustain and enforce unity. Rwandan society was shaped by social classes - namely Tutsi, Hutu and Twa - across families and clans.

These social classes were based on wealth and livelihood characterized by identifiers such as cattle herding, agriculture, hunting and basketry, whereby cows culturally and comparatively represented wealth¹.

The shared culture, language, values, customs and spiritual beliefs made Rwandans identify themselves as Rwandans, not by any other denomination.

Pre-colonial Rwanda was a kingdom and the king was considered a unifying figure with no racial or ethnic affiliation - he was the leader of all Rwandans.

Unifying factors in pre-colonial Rwanda

a. The Clan

In pre-colonial Rwanda, people identified themselves through clans that were irrespective of their social status (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa). Ethnic or racial descriptions were non-existent at this time.

Rwandans in all categories shared 18 clans². Each clan was a social group whose members acknowledged descent from a common ancestor - either real or mythical. Clans were denominators that united many different lineages which may not have necessarily known each other³.

¹Shyaka, Anastase (2007). *The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development and Exit Strategies*. Kigali: SIDA.

²The 18 clans often mentioned, alphabetically here, are: Ababanda, Abacyaba, Abagesera, Abaha, Abahondogo, Abakono, Abanyakarama, Abashambo, Abashingo, Abasindi, Abasinga, Abasita, Abatsobe, Abazigaba, Abega, Abenengwe, Abongerera, Abungura.

³D'HERTEFELT M. (1971). *Les clans du Rwanda ancien, Tervuren, Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale*

In a study completed in the late 1950s, the historian Marcel D'Heltefelt confirmed that pre-colonial Rwandan clans included all social categories (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa).

He also emphasized that, irrespective of being part of a social class, members of the same clan shared other identifiers such as totems, religious beliefs and ritual functions⁴.

Kinyarwanda as a shared language

Rwandans have always shared the same language "Kinyarwanda". Distinctive language has often been taken as a criterion for belonging to a separate ethnic group⁵. Sharing this language demonstrates that Rwandans have shared the same culture, cultural philosophy, beliefs and aspirations. By having a common language, Rwandans have shared the very reality of their symbolic, mythical and transcendental universe.

Culture, beliefs and ethics

Life in Rwanda was characterized by shared spiritual beliefs (Rwandans were a monotheistic society) and beliefs in the afterworld (cult of the ancestors and processes to appease their spirits). These beliefs bonded Rwandans, their families and their creator⁶.

Shared values such as patriotism, integrity, heroism, excellence, protection of those in need and those who seek protection from imminent danger, preservation of life, and certain taboos like killing children and women, were inscribed in Rwandan culture⁷.

2. Colonial rule and the destruction of the Rwandan identity

The colonial period in Rwanda took place from 1897 to 1962, beginning with German rule (1897-1916). During this period (and a little before) explorers constructed theories based on myths that any order they found in Rwanda had to have been imported to the region from elsewhere. Everything Europeans found admirable in the country was assumed to have come from the north, from either Egypt or Ethiopia⁸.

⁴D'Heltefelt, M. (1971). *Les Clans du Rwanda ancien : Eléments d'ethnohistoire et d'ethnosociologie*, Terrvuren: MRAC;De Lacger, Ruanda; Gatwa, T. (2005), p. 10

⁵Gasarabwe, E. (1978). *Geste Rwanda*, Paris : Union générale d'éditions, p.29, In Gatwa, T. (2005), p. 16.

⁶Gatwa, Tharcisse (2005). *The Churches and Ethnic Ideology in the Rwandan Crises, 1990-1994*, Eugene Oregon: Regnum Books International,

⁷NURC (2005). *The role of Women in Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide (1994-2004)*, p.8.

⁸NURC & NUR, *Histoire du Rwanda, des origines a la fin du XXeme siecle*, 1st edition, 2011

German colonial rule was followed by the Belgians (1916 – 1962). The Belgian colonial administration prioritized the disempowerment of the traditional authorities, starting with the king. Social structures that were meant to build and sustain unity among Rwandans were abolished - among these there were Itorero and Umuganura. Institutions that were mandated to sustain and preserve the nation's historic memory and the royal lineage (Ubwiru) were also abolished.

Racial theories were introduced based on books by explorers who first entered the Kingdom of Rwanda and depicted Rwandans as different from other African peoples. Races were introduced, copied from racial descriptions used in Belgium (Belgian Flemings and Walloons), creating in the process the division which would later be translated into persecution and Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. Traditional Rwandan social denominations of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were transformed into races and ethnic groups basing on false Hamitic theory (also known as the Hamite thesis)⁹.

The Belgian colonizers' belief in the flawed Hamitic theory was not only because of their failure to understand Rwandan culture but due to their "divide and rule" agenda. They created a false history of Rwanda in an attempt to not only explain the African cultural phenomena through their worldview, but to advance their own hegemonic interest¹⁰.

When the well-known British explorer John Speek arrived in the neighboring kingdom of Buganda (now Uganda), which had also developed sociopolitical organization, he attributed the civilization to an indigenous race of nomad herdsmen related to Gala Hamites (Ethiopians). What attracted Europeans to this supposition was that it helped them to establish links between physical characteristics and mental capacities: Hamites were supposed to have inborn leadership qualities and had, in principle, the right to a history and a future, which are almost as "noble" as those of their European cousins¹¹.

The Belgians institutionalized divisionism in Rwanda right after the Germans handed the country over to them under the League of Nations¹². Significant administrative reforms introduced by the Belgian colonizers seriously modified the traditional Rwandan structures, the most consequential of which was the then-unprecedented policy of ethnic division¹³.

⁹Rutembesa, Faustin (2001). « Ruptures culturelles et génocide au Rwanda » In *Cahiers du Centre de Gestion des Conflits*, n°2, Butare, E.U.N.R., Avril, pp. 93-123.

¹⁰Uvin, Peter (1999). *L'aide complice : coopération internationale et violence au Rwanda*. Paris : L'Harmattan; Shyaka, Anastase (2002). *La genèse des conflits dans les pays d'Afrique des Grands lacs : Rwanda, Burundi, DRC et l'Ouganda*. In *Peuplement du Rwanda : enjeu et perspectives*. Cahier du Centre de Gestion des Conflits (No.5), Université Nationale du Rwanda, pp.121-143 ; Obura, Anna (2003) *Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda*. International Institute for Educational Planning: UNESCO. October, Kigali, p.101.

¹¹Linden, I. (1977). *Church and Revolution in Rwanda*: Manchester University press.

¹²Kagame, A. (1972). *Un abrégé de l'ethno histoire du Rwanda*, Butare.

¹³Idem. 1972

In a letter dated September 21st, 1927, John Speek wrote to Georges Mortehean, the Belgian Resident in Rwanda, saying: "If we want to be practical and if we look for the real interest of the country, we have an incomparable element of progress in the Mututsi youth. Born with leadership qualities, Batutsi have the sense of command. It is the secret of their establishment in the country and their hold over it¹⁴."

Then in 1923, discriminatory policies were introduced among Rwandans whereby traditional social classes (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) were given new descriptions as ethnic groups.

Concerned by what could be seen as hesitation from the colonial administration, the Catholic Church, through Bishop Léon-Paul Classe White Father (the first Apostolic Vicar of Rwanda who occupied Episcopal See of Kabgayi from 1922 to 1945), issued a warning in 1930, compelling the administration to consider the Tutsi as noble and best suited for leadership in the following terms:

"The biggest mistake that the government may do to itself and the country would be to suppress the Mututsi caste [Tutsi people]. The revolution of that type would lead the country into anarchy and to anti-European communism. Instead of bringing progress, it will ruin the government's action, by depriving it of its auxiliaries who are born capable of understanding and follow. In general rules, we will not have chiefs; better, intelligent, more capable of comprehending progress and even more accepted by the population than Batutsi.¹⁵"

The message from the Apostolic Vicar was understood in principle as fervent advocacy which promoted a Tutsi monopoly and ended the administration's hesitations. Therefore, with the blessing of the Catholic Church, the colonizers executed the "divide and rule" colonial strategy based on racial superiority and inferiority.

In 1931, the Belgian administration officially introduced identity cards containing Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Reference to ethnicity became mandatory for all individual's administrative documents¹⁶.

The "Mortehean Reform" (1926-1932; initiated by Georges Mortehean) instituted a revolutionary change to Rwandan institutions, society and culture. Ancient royal administrative units, the "chefferies" and "sous-chefferies", were institutionalized, but the chiefs of pastures and chiefs of the army were removed, as was the power of the king to select or dismiss his chiefs.

¹⁴ Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports & Ibuka Association (2004).

¹⁵ Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports & Ibuka Association (2004).

¹⁶ Destexhe, A. (1995). *Rwanda and Genocide in Century*. London: Pluto Press the Twentieth.

Hutu, Twa and Tutsi were removed from power and replaced by Tutsi aristocrats. The new political organization created a Tutsi monopoly. It strengthened ethnic identification through the extension of the authority of the Tutsi aristocracy to regions where it had previously never been recognized. Several Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs were dismissed not because of incapacity but because of their Hutu identity¹⁷.

The predominance of Tutsi administration auxiliaries was strengthened and sustained by the creation of an administrative section at the school Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida (current Groupe Scolaire Officiel de Butare) in 1929. This school was uniquely meant for Tutsi children from high-ranking Tutsi families. They were given the name Indatwa (the prestigious ones).

It became obvious that some people were being favored and provided with advantages, while others were deprived of their rights. The administrative reform by the colonial rulers laid the foundation of an exclusion-based administration. Some authors like John Rawly attributed the development of such resentments and the threat to national cohesion to the new structures which institutionalized inequalities¹⁸.

Moreover, the land tenure system in pre-colonial Rwanda was characterized by the collective ownership of land. There was a natural complement between agriculture and livestock under customary law that allowed for stability and social harmony. The colonial introduction of property ownership and land transfer created social cleavages within Rwanda that emphasized the social construction of ethnicity, the elite capture of land and power, and poor land governance¹⁹.

Social cohesion in Rwanda was further destroyed by the introduction of institutionalized politicization of ethnicities. Surveys of citizens portrayed Hutu as the majority ethnic group with 85% and Tutsi as the minority with only 14% of the population.

These figures came into play for the first time as a political asset during the 1953 and 1956 so-called "elections" organized by the colonizers. This system was erroneously promoted as democratic, which justified the government being led by people who belonged to the majority ethnic group (Hutu).

¹⁷NUR & NURC, *Histoire du Rwanda DES ORIGINES A LA FIN DU XXe SIECLE* www.nurc.gov.rw.

¹⁸Chretien, J. P (1995). *Rwanda, les médias du genocide*, Paris : Karthala.

¹⁹Vansina (2001). *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*, New York, University of Wisconsin Press, p.168; Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forests, Water and Mines (2004). *National land policy*, February, Kigali, p.10; Takeuchi Marara 2009). *Conflict and Land Tenure in Rwanda*. No 1, September, Tokyo: JICA research institute, p.8.

3. The Rupture between the colonial administration and the Tutsi elite

In the 1950s, members from the country's leading elite started advocating for independence from Belgian colonial administration and calling for reforms to address the divisive policies installed by them. This created a rupture prompting the administration to turn their attention to promoting and raising a Hutu elite assisted by the Catholic missionaries. This Hutu elite was raised with an ethnic-based ideology of hatred that put all the blame of ill treatment/cruelty and all colonial frustrations and responsibilities on the Tutsi²⁰.

Some members of the Tutsi elite understood that the Belgians wanted to divide Rwandans to serve their own interests. They refused to be divided on the basis of ethnicity and became non-collaborators while also starting to fight for independence. Realizing that this elite group was increasingly promoting nationalism and independence, the Belgian colonizers and the Catholic missionaries changed plans and quickly initiated preparations to create an alternative Hutu elite, while putting all the blame on their former Tutsi allies²¹.

The colonial administration opted for a progressive independence strategy implying that Rwanda-Urundi at the time still lacked political maturity. In November 1957, a reform bill from the Resident of Rwanda-Urundi and the Director of Political Affairs in the Governor General's office was proposed with an urgent request for consideration without delay because the situation was deemed critical. The bill stated, "At a time like this when the peasants and Bahutu manifesto have expressed their request, we have to lead the Territory towards a democratic regime which seeks the emancipation of individuals from feudal bondage. The peasants have put their trust in us, and if we wait indefinitely, it would be dangerous to see them turn their back on us and even listen to the advice of bad shepherds."

The Belgian administration's political solution was to ally with the Hutu majority to continue serving its colonial interests. Working in collaboration and using the power the Belgians had, including control of the police force, the Hutu began overriding the Tutsi elite's demands.

In a meeting held on January 28th, 1958, the colonial administration agreed to provide local elites with technical support, especially in the areas where they lacked expertise, to transfer power under the reform bill.

²⁰Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports & Ibuka Association (2004). *Ibid.*

²¹Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports & Ibuka Association (2004). *Ibid.*

Governor General Léo Pétillon (Vice Governor-General of Ruanda-Urundi in 1946 and Governor General from 1952 to 1958) accepted this proposal and in his response, he emphasized, "We must encourage or support the efforts of the Hutu by helping them achieve their political and social demands of emancipation. In this regard, we will get support from international bodies, high ecclesiastical authorities and active elements of the European population²²."

4. The establishment of political parties in 1959

In Rwanda, political parties were created in 1959 from the Legislative Order No. 11/234 political associations, which was approved by Ordinance R.U. No.111/105 on June 15th, 1959²³. Following this order, between September 1959 to May 1960, 20 political organizations were created. Four of these parties monopolized the national political scene while others served as regional parties.

The four (4) parties that monopolized the political scene were:

- » **APROSOMA** (Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse): The president of APROSOMA was Joseph Habyarimana, also known as Gitera. He was the first Hutu political leader to encourage the Hutu youths to "take machetes and exterminate the Tutsi" who he referred to as a "deep wound" (igisebe cy'umufunzo), a "leech inside the body" and a "stomach cancer". He once said to the Hutu Youths, "Remember, he who kills rats does not pity those under gestation."
- » **UNAR** (Union Nationale Rwandaise): UNAR set out to energetically fight against anything that stirred up conflicts, against any division-oriented activities and any kind of provocation leading to racial hatred.
- » **RADER** (Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais): According to Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame, RADER was a fictitious party as from the moment of its creation, it attracted office clerks working for the Belgian administrators²⁴. However, its leaders wanted it to be a centrist party that would bring UNAR and Hutu parties together.
- » **PARMEHUTU** (Parti du Mouvement de l'Emmancipation des Bahutu) led by Kayibanda Gregoire : From its inception, PARMEHUTU harbored hatred against the Tutsi ethnic group. They targeted the Tutsi as a problem to be terminated once and for all before gaining independence, hence their slogan "democracy first, independence later".

²²Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports & Ibuka Association (2004). *Ibid.*

²³*Idem.*

²⁴*Idem.*

PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA were advocating for the progressive democratization of Rwandans based first on the total emancipation of the masses (Hutu) followed by full independence after around 30 to 40 years²⁵. The colonial administration aligned with this mission and supported it by actively participating in the mass mobilization of Hutu against the Tutsi. The administration engineered an uprising known as the “1959 Hutu Revolution” which resulted in the persecution and killings of thousands of Tutsi, as well as forcing hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighboring countries notably in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and former Zaïre.

In 1960, the Belgian administration worked with PARMEHUTU and installed administrative structures that replaced the existing ones. Communes replaced chieftaincies, Prefectures replaced territories and their respective leaders were accordingly appointed – and most were PARMEHUTU followers.

Rwanda was given independence on July 1st, 1962. From this date, Tutsi were forced into exile. Those who remained in Rwanda suffered multiple forms of persecution.

²⁵Dr Bizimana Jean Damascène, *L'itinéraire du génocide commis contre les Tutsi*, CNLG, 2014.

Independence was celebrated as an achievement from the 1959 Hutu Revolution. It was spearheaded by the ethnically radical PARMEHUTU whose ideology promoted and encouraged the indiscriminate persecution of Tutsi across the country.

Post-independence Rwanda was characterized by ethnic based hatred including the dehumanization, persecution, segregation, and exclusion of Tutsi through cycles of massacres, unpunished killings and repetitive forced exile ²⁶.

1. Characteristics of Rwanda under the First Republic (1962-1973) and Second Republic (1973-1994)

The hatred against the Tutsi that characterized the First and Second Republics was based on spreading the ideology of hutuism. This ideology is best illustrated by the 10 Hutu commandments issued and published in 1959 by the APROSOMA political party. These were re-published in the newspaper *Kangura* in its December 1990 (No. 6) edition with the endorsement of the MRND-led genocidal government.

These 10 commandments constituted a solid foundation for division, hatred and persecution against Tutsi since 1959, which reached its peak with the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi ²⁷.

The First Republic, under Grégoire Kayibanda's presidency, asserted its legitimacy and power on the social and political persecution of the Tutsi and the mass adherence of the population to the PARMEHUTU ideology. This political party openly preached hatred against Tutsi, calling them snakes, cockroaches, untrustworthy and foreigners, who should be sent back to where they supposedly came from (Abyssinia-Ethiopia). They organized cyclical killings of Tutsi (1963-1967, 1973, etc.) that further sent waves of Tutsi into exile.

²⁶Republic of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). *Unity and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda*, December 2016.

²⁷Source: *Kangura Newspaper*, No. 6 of December, 1990.

Through sensitization and propaganda, local political administrative authorities urged the population of their jurisdictions to persecute Tutsi. Intense anti-Tutsi propaganda constituted the bulk of President Kayibanda's public speeches, as well as radio broadcasts, popular songs, school classes and more. Such propaganda was used to dehumanize Tutsi, accusing them of being foreigners who had conquered and subjugated the Hutu for centuries. The Tutsi who remained in the country were deprived of their political and civil rights. They were denied by the state the right to education, the right to employment, the right to civil participation and other human rights.

In one of his public speeches, President Kayibanda said that in Rwanda there were, "Two nations in a single state, two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets"²⁸.

In the eyes of President Kayibanda himself, social cohesion between Hutu and Tutsi could only be achieved by the establishment of two separate zones, otherwise one ethnic group had to disappear to allow the other to prosper. President Kayibanda went further by submitting a proposal to the UN and the former Belgian colonial authority for zone redistribution to establish the Hutu-land and the Tutsi-land. The Tutsi-land would be the more habitable part of Bugesera, Buganza and all surrounding territory that had become the provinces of Kibungo and Umutara (the Eastern-part of Rwanda); the remaining part of the country would be the "Hutu-land".

In December 1963, Tutsi were massacred in killing sprees across the country that were organized by the Government of President Kayibanda.

On December 21st, 1963, Rwandan Tutsi refugees planned an armed attack in Bugesera. They entered from Burundi, where they managed to capture the Gako Military barracks and advanced up to the Akagera bridge. Following this event, President Kayibanda's administration retaliated with a killing of Tutsi in Bugesera, and these killings spread to other regions of the country.

In Gikongoro, the killing of Tutsi began on December 24th, 1963, the day before Christmas Day (which was labelled "The Blood Christmas"). These killings were organized and supervised by the then Minister of Agriculture, Nkezabera Ephrem, with the then Prefect of Gikongoro Prefecture, Nkeramugaba André²⁹.

²⁸ Longman, Timothy (1999). *State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda*. In Joseph, R. (Ed). *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Mail.

²⁹Bizimana Jean Damascène, *L'itinéraire du génocide commis contre les Tutsi, Kigali, 2014 ; Inzira ya Jenocide yakorewe Abatutsi, Kigali, 2014*.

In Cyangugu Prefecture, the Tutsi began to be killed after the Christmas mass. These killing sprees were overseen by the then Minister of Public Sector and Energy, Otto Rusingizandekwe, who had been delegated by President Kayibanda to plan and action the killings with the then Prefect of Cyangugu Mr. Ngirabatware Pascal.

The killings of Tutsi in 1963 were executed not only in Gikongoro and Cyangugu but also in Kigali, Gisenyi, Kibungo, Byumba and Kibuye. Though the killings happened after the armed incursion on Inyenzi in Bugesera, President Kayibanda's government had been informed about these planned attacks and had already established lists of Tutsi to be killed. Before the December 1963 armed incursion, lists of targeted Tutsi had been established in every prefecture by Ministers and Prefects³⁰. Across the whole of Rwanda, between 25,000 and 35,000 Tutsi were massacred.

The 1963 massacres were referred to as genocide by expatriates who lived and worked in Rwanda during that time. A Swiss national, Denis-Gilles Vuillemin, a teacher at the Groupe Scolaire Officiel de Butare who worked for UNESCO, resigned after writing a letter to President Kayibanda saying that he could no longer bear the burden of seeing Tutsi (including some of his students) being killed in a campaign led by the authorities. Some of his students took part in killing their comrades. This was the first time the word genocide was used in Rwanda's history³¹.

Foreign media also reported the massacres in Rwanda, referring to them as genocide. An issue of *Le Monde* (published on February 4th, 1964) explained how Rwandan Tutsi were being killed in campaigns by the government. *Le Figaro* (published on February 11th, 1964) also condemned what it called the "1963 Genocide". Radio France Internationale (RFI) and Radio Vatican also reported these massacres. On February 10th, 1964, Radio Vatican announced, "The most terrible systematic genocide since the Genocide of the Jews is occurring in the heart of Africa. Thousands of men are killed every day in Rwanda."³²

These reports and publications did not please President Kayibanda who threatened to prosecute and expel those who published information about the perpetrated killings and massacres of Tutsi³³.

³⁰Mugesera Antoine, *IMIBEREHO Y'ABATUTSI MU RWANDA : 1959-1990 : Itotezwa rihoraho. Ugushyingo* 2015, p.159.

³¹Komisiyo y'Igihugu yo Kurwanya Jenocide, *Ikiganiro cyatanzwe na Senateri Dr Bizimana Jean Damascène ku itariki 26 Gashyantare 2012mu muhango wo gushyigura mu cyubahiro imibiri y'Abatutsi biciwe ku Cyanika, Akarere ka Nyamagabe.*

³² *Dr Bizimana Jean Damascène, L'itinéraire du Génocide commis contre les Tutsi, Kigali, 2014, p.57.*

³³ *Idem, Kigali, 2014 p.57.*

Among those who reported the killings were Catholic priests who were brave enough to do so. However, Andre Perraudin, the Archbishop of Kabgayi, the most senior Catholic church official in Rwanda at the time, pleaded in favour of the government in terms which distorted the narrative describing the killings as genocide.

Regarding the killings of December 1963, Perraudin wrote, "At the end of December 1963, vast terrorist attacks towards the capital Kigali and, in the North, campaign of false rumours. Extreme tension in the country. The Hutu, realizing that they came close to the danger of falling back into the feudal regime and then, that among the Tutsi who lived with them, a certain number were complicit, popular fury was unleashed".³⁴

During his tenure, President Kayibanda released a speech on March 29th, 1964 in which he warned the Tutsi against the danger they could face if they attempted to oppose his government stating that "assuming that, by the impossible, you come to take Kigali by assault, how will you measure chaos of which you will be the first victims? I do not insist, you guess how you'll be desperate! As you know, it would be a total and precipitated end of the Tutsi race³⁵."

During the ninth congress of PARMEHUTU, Balthazar Bicamumpaka, one of the party's founders said that "PARMEHUTU is an ideology, a dogma and an objective to reach³⁶. The ideology was to exterminate all Tutsi from the Rwandan map. The national politics of the First and Second Republics were therefore the same in persecuting and killing Tutsi³⁷. Policies of regionalism, favoritism and ethnicity were prioritized.

In February 1973, a campaign to expel Tutsi from schools and the labor market was launched and implemented by a group of students called the "Committee of Public Safety" (Comité du Salut Public). The Committee was established in every school and given instructions from the highest national authorities in the PARMEHUTU party. These groups were supported by President Kayibanda and other officials who would meet with their representatives at the president's residence in Kavumu (Gitarama) for sessions to reassess and plan for the persecution campaigns against Tutsi. These sessions would be held in the presence of other officials from the PARMEHUTU including the Secretary General, Athanase Mbarubukeye³⁸.

³⁴ Mugesera A. *A travers livres et revues, Mgr André Perraudin « Un Evêque au Rwanda »*, 2003.

³⁵ *Rwanda Carrefour d'Afrique*, No 31 Mars 1964.

³⁶ Caplan, G. (2007). *Rwanda's Genocide: First the Deed, Then the Denial*. Toronto: The Globe.

³⁷ Caplan, G. (2007). *Rwanda's Genocide: First the Deed, Then the Denial*. Toronto: The Globe.

³⁸ Bizimana Jean Damascène, *Itinéraire du génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda, Kigali*. P. 61.

The exclusion of Tutsi from schools and the labor market (both public and private), was meant to prevent them gaining any rank in social class and persecute them so that they were forced into a life of poverty.

In 1973, President Kayibanda was deposed in a military coup by Juvénal Habyarimana and the PARMEHUTU were replaced by the MRND party. MRND pursued the same discriminatory policies against the Tutsi, introducing more policies against regions other than those in northern Rwanda. Regional discrimination was formally established under the MRND, as was the so-called ethnic balance (Iringaniza) meant to establish ethnic based quotas in all sectors of national life (schools, security, public sector, etc.).

Rather than addressing the socio-economic issues inherited from the colonial and First Republic, the new regime continued dividing Rwandans by ethnicity, enforcing the continued persecution and discrimination against Tutsi. This environment of continuous persecution, hatred, divisionism, forced exile and loss of national values led to the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994³⁹.

Under the Second Republic, Hutu, particularly those from the north, sensitized by the regime that they had been historically disadvantaged by the Tutsi, were attributed the lions share. After his 1973 political coup, Habyarimana publicly announced the general orientations of regional and ethnic political equilibrium in these terms: “it is comprehensible that admission in different schools will take into consideration the social, ethnic and regional composition of the Rwandan community⁴⁰.”

Under the MRND rule, the Tutsi were excluded from public life. Those in exile were informed that they had no right to repatriation and were advised to seek citizenship in their respective countries of exile. From 1986, economic crises, power monopolization, institutionalized impunity, fraud, corruption and all sorts of other abuses were common practice across the nation.

It was under these conditions that in 1987, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF-Inkotanyi) was formed with the mission to repatriate all Rwandans and install democratic, citizen-centered leadership built on the rule of law in Rwanda. The RPF-Inkotanyi attempted to engage with President Habyarimana's MRND government who refused to consider the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. Their refusal to engage resulted in the launch of the liberation struggle on October 1st, 1990.

³⁹ MINEDUC (2003). *Education Sector Policy*, Kigali., p.3.

⁴⁰MINEPRISEC (1985). *Données sur les admissions scolaires publiques et privées ; les bourses d'études ; le personnel de l'enseignement secondaire ; les constructions et extensions des établissements secondaires Durant la période 1981-1985, II Rapport No 34, Octobre, Kigali.*

Instead, the MRND government radicalized the Rwandan political environment and increased persecution of the Tutsi in the country, furthering the planning for the Genocide against the Tutsi. The full-scale Genocide in 1994 was preceded by acts of genocide against Tutsi (and the opposition) in 1990, 1991 and 1992.

2. Preparation of the Genocide against the Tutsi

2.1. Establishment of multiparty political system

In 1991, the MRND-led government allowed political parties to form in an attempt to open up the political space and become a multiparty system. Several parties were formed including the MDR (Mouvement Démocrate Républicain), PSD (Parti Social-Démocrate), PL (Parti Liberal), PDC (Parti Démocrate-Chrétien), PDI (Parti Démocrate Islamique), CDR (Coalition pour la Défense de la République), among others.

The establishment of the multiparty system was a result of pressure from educated Rwandans who requested a change in leadership from President Habyarimana's government. To maintain its grip on power, the MRND created satellite parties such as the CDR which would plead allegiance to it, and later on lead the establishment of the Hutu Power ideology and mobilize factions from within other parties such as the MDR and PL.

2.2. Incitement to hatred and killing of Tutsi

After the RPF-Inkotanyi launched the liberation war in October 1990, many extremist political leaders convened meetings at different levels (including the hardline political wings of MRND, CDR and MDR) to incite the Hutu to kill Tutsi. These individuals would later lead the Hutu Power ideology.

The liberation war served as a pretext for a group of Hutu hardliners under Hutu Power to openly persecute and kill the Tutsi. To force cooperation, the regime mobilized the population in a call to fight against Tutsi invaders from Uganda and their collaborators from within the country (their accomplices). Ideological messages would incite the population into believing that the Tutsi wanted to retake power which they said was rightfully gained by the Hutu and re-install the monarchy and its related slavery. Hutu were manipulated to see Tutsi as their enemy and were called to fight and get rid of them as means of self-defense. Some of the key ideological messages used to mobilize the population against the Tutsi included:

- » The Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there.
- » Despite the 1959 revolution, the Tutsi continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than the Hutu; the Tutsi were in some way responsible for continuing Hutu poverty.
- » The Tutsi posed a danger to the Hutu, who were always the victims, by using their military power or malice (such as the use of their women to seduce Hutu), so Hutu had a right and a duty to defend themselves.

Those who opposed this plan were considered traitors. That propaganda drove Hutu to commit the Genocide.

2.3. Spreading genocide ideology through media

Before and during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the media played a major role in supporting and inciting ethnic hatred and violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Public and some private media were used to spread hate, incite violence and encourage Hutu to kill their Tutsi countrymen. The hate propaganda was accompanied by direct calls for the extermination of the Tutsi⁴¹.

2.3.1 Hate propaganda through Kangura Newspaper

Kangura was a Hutu propaganda newspaper founded by Hassan Ngeze in May 1990 written in both Kinyarwanda and French. The paper ran until 1995, with its final issues published outside of Rwanda⁴². In order to disseminate hatred against the Tutsi, Kangura published an article entitled "Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu" containing the Ten Commandments that should govern every Hutu⁴³.

The "10 commandments" described the Tutsi as "thirsty for blood and power, seeking to impose their hegemony over Rwanda by rifle and cannon⁴⁴." They sought to ensure the complete mobilization of the Hutu, so they could unite and have a single aim of fighting the Tutsi.

⁴¹Timmermann, W. (2005). *The relationship between hate propaganda and Incitement to Genocide: A new trend in International Law towards criminalization of Hate propaganda*. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Volume 18, pp.257-282.

⁴²Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, 2003, par. 122.

⁴³ *Kangura* No 6, December 1990.

⁴⁴Schabas, W. A. (November 2000). *International Conference: Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide*. *McGill Law Journal*.

These “commandments” instructed that there should be no links or relationships between Hutu and Tutsi, to the extent that during the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, Hutu killed their Tutsi spouses, and even their children. Children born of mixed marriages, whether they had a Tutsi mother or a Hutu father, thought that if they were more Hutu than Tutsi, they should kill their own parents. Kangura's call for racial hatred was denounced in February 1991 by the International Commission of Jurists. But when President Habyarimana was confronted on the subject, in April 1991, he defended Kangura claiming “freedom of expression”.

In an article published in January 1991 (Kangura Issue No. 54), Hassan Ngeze wrote, “Let's hope that the Inyenzi [cockroaches] will have the courage to understand what is going to happen and realize that if they make a small mistake, they will be exterminated; if they make the mistake of attacking again, there will be none of them left in Rwanda, not even a single accomplice.”⁴⁵

In November 1991, the Kangura issued an article in which a machete was drawn next to the title. The author, Ngeze, suggested traditional weapons, such as machetes, could be used to overcome the enemy. “Which arms should we use to vanquish Inyenzi forever? If the Hutu 1959 revolution should be brought back for us to vanquish Inyenzi-Intutsi⁴⁶.” Here, Ngeze recalled the so-called 1959 revolution in which Hutu killed Tutsi using machetes and other traditional weapons. As he stated, the RPF-Inkotanyi who attacked Rwanda were Tutsi who wanted to restore the Tutsi monarchy. He called for the mass killings of accomplices who supported the enemy: “You Rwandans, do you accept that the Rwandan Armed Forces continue to wait for enemy who will come from Uganda while they left enemies in Kigali and in other's towns? The Inkotanyi and “virgile” (accomplices) must know that they don't bleed milk, because now we are angry for the Rwandans (citizens and soldiers) who are being killed by Inkotanyi⁴⁷.”

In a 1993 Kangura editorial, Ngeze again called on Hutu to kill Tutsi living in Rwanda before going to fight them on the borders, arguing, “There is no way that you can send soldiers to go and fight Inyenzi on the border while you left some others one in the interior of the country. Why not search for accomplices and kill them?”⁴⁸

Regarding the dangerous role of Kangura in the Genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) later stated that much of its contents “combined ethnic hatred and fear-mongering with a call to violence to be directed against the Tutsi population”. Kangura paved the way for genocide in Rwanda, mobilizing Hutu into a killing frenzy.⁴⁹

⁴⁵*Nahimana v. Prosecutor, 2007 par.771.*

⁴⁶*Kangura, No 26 November 1991.*

⁴⁷*Kangura, No 26 November 1991, p.15.*

⁴⁸ *Kangura N o 41, March 1993.*

⁴⁹ *Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (December 3, 2003*

2.3.2 Hate propaganda through Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM)

Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was a private Rwandan radio station which broadcasted programs from July 8th, 1993 to July 31st, 1994. Referred to as "Hate Radio", it was founded and owned by political actors associated with hardliners within the then ruling regime who are largely seen as the masterminds responsible for organizing and implementing the genocide⁵⁰.

In an RTLM broadcast on July 2nd, 1994, Habimana Kantano, the radio's Chief Anchor, exulted in the extermination of the Inkotanyi by stating on air, "So, where did all the Inkotanyi who used to telephone me go, eh? They must have been exterminated. ... Let us sing: "Come, let us rejoice: the Inkotanyi have been exterminated! Come dear friends, let us rejoice, the Good Lord is just." The Good Lord is really just, these evildoers, these terrorists, these people with suicidal tendencies will end up being exterminated.⁵¹" RTLM spread messages warning all Hutu that they were at risk of being attacked, overwhelmed, decolonized and exploited by Tutsi and that appropriate measures should be taken to prevent this⁵².

RTLM's role in the Genocide was asserted by the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR) in the following terms, "RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt and hatred for the Tutsi population. It called on listeners to seek out and take up arms against the enemy. The enemy was identified as the RPF, the Inkotanyi, the Inyenzi, and their accomplices, all of whom were effectively equated with the Tutsi ethnic group by the broadcasts. After 6 April 1994, the virulence and the intensity of RTLM broadcasts propagating ethnic hatred and calling for violence increased. These broadcasts called explicitly for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group⁵³."

2.3.3 Hate propaganda through Radio Rwanda

Radio Rwanda was, until 1993, the only radio broadcaster in Rwanda. As the national broadcaster, it was considered as the most trusted source and channel of information. This trust was used to call onto the population to persecute Tutsi. Alongside Kangura and RTLM, Radio Rwanda spread hate propaganda to incite violence. Radio Rwanda was used as a reliable communication channel of President Habyarimana regime's propaganda against the RPF-Inkotanyi and against the Tutsi, and it played a pernicious role in instigating massacres.

⁵⁰Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza were both influential members of the "Comité d'Initiative" (the Steering Committee) which founded Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines ("RTLM). Félicien Kabuga was one of the major shareholders and the chair or President of general assembly of all shareholders; Ephrem Nkezabera was responsible for finance.

⁵¹Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, 2003, par. 403.

⁵²Mironko, C. (2007). "RTLM's Rhetoric of Ethnic Hatred in Rural Rwanda," in *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, ed. Allan Thompson. New York: Pluto Press.

⁵³Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, 2003, par. 486.

On March 3rd, 1992, Radio Rwanda was first used to directly promote the killing of Tutsi in the Bugesera region, just south of the capital Kigali. Before the massacres, the radio repeatedly broadcast announcements warning that Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked by Tutsi. Local officials built on the radio announcement to convince Hutu that they needed to protect themselves by attacking first. Led by soldiers from a nearby military base, members of the Interahamwe, a militia attached to the MRND party, and local Hutu citizens attacked and killed hundreds of Tutsi⁵⁴.

Genocide ideologists made use of the RTLM, Radio Rwanda and Kangura newspaper to convey their propagandist language which facilitated incendiary discourse and had a profound effect on the intended audience, who in turn committed the Genocide. The ICTR found that hate speech disseminated through media to target a population based on ethnicity (or other discriminatory grounds) was as grave as the other acts which constituted crimes against humanity; they therefore were prosecuted⁵⁵.

The Genocide propaganda was made possible by so-called freedom of expression. Pretending to be a part of the independent press, the media focused on distilling hate, inciting violence and encouraging Hutu to kill their fellow countrymen, the Tutsi.

Between 1991 and 1993, President Habyarimana's government and his dignitaries created several extremist newspapers to spread anti-Tutsi hatred among the population. In addition to Kangura and RTLM, these included:

- Umurwanashyaka, journal du MRDN
- Echo des mille collines
- Ikinani
- La medaille Nyiramacibiri
- Ziriikkana
- Pawa
- Umurava Magazine
- Kamarampaka
- Umuranga
- Intera
- Jyambere
- Etc...

⁵⁴International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, 1993: 27

⁵⁵ Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, 2003, par. 1072.

2.4. Creation of Interahamwe militia

Recruited from the youth wing of the MRND, the Interahamwe militia was created at the end of 1991 following the restructuring of the MRND party and the advent of multiparty politics in Rwanda.

The Interahamwe was united by a mission to unconditionally protect the MRND regime. They would carry out criminal acts, commit crimes and assassinations in order to terrorize people and divert them from their democratic ideal by making them helpless and confused. They would create a general and widespread sense of insecurity in the country in order to psychologically prepare the Rwandan public opinion for the acts of murder planned in the near future. And they would carry out criminal and terrorist acts against opposition political parties and their members essentially those from the MDR and the PL parties⁵⁶.

2.5. Organization of Citizen Self-Defense

In addition to mobilizing youth from political parties, President Habyarimana and members of his security organs planned the creation of militias under the description of civil self-defense organizations. With Hutu Power hardliners positioned across all political parties, the self-defense program was widely considered and in October 1993 after a rally of Hutu Power affiliates, a commission of Rwandan army officers met to organize and structure the program.

By early 1994 planners of the citizen self-defense program met and published a document titled "Organization of citizen self-defense" ("Organisation de l'Auto-Défense Civile"). It was neither signed nor dated, but its authenticity was established by Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of the interim government which conducted the Genocide against the Tutsi from April 1994 to July 1994. Investigators from the ICTR seized the document when they arrested Kambanda in 1997. In a statement to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, Kambanda identified the document, said it was regarded as highly confidential, and said that it clearly predated April 1994. Through analysis of the content and comparison with other documents and witness interviews, it appears that the document is dated from mid-February 1994 or at the latest March 1994.

The self-defense system was formalized after the establishment of the interim Hutu Power-led government on April 9th, 1994. Ten days after the government took office, the authorities directed the recruitment of citizens to the program across the country.

⁵⁶ICTR-98-44-T, INTERAHAMWE ZA MUVOMA, a document elaborated by Dr GASANA Anasthase, 14 May 1992.

Local military commanders were ordered to coordinate the plan and cooperate with local administrative structures (Burgomasters and community councilors) to recruit young men who were selected according to the administrative unit in which they lived. They were trained to use weapons by police officers or reservists⁵⁷.

Following the formal establishment of the program, the Interahamwe were incorporated. Their highly trained groups served as elite units to lead the less well trained (or untrained) ordinary citizens. According to Kambanda, the militarily trained Interahamwe were systematically incorporated into the citizen defense under the label "youth of republican tendencies" (a phrase similar to those found in the "Organization of citizen self-defense" document), which in effect gave clear government approval to the crimes in which they had been engaged since early April 1994.

In the weeks before its formal establishment, as in the weeks after, the citizen self-defense system was used to mobilize ordinary citizens to hunt Tutsi citizens who had been identified as enemies of the state. Using the citizen self-defense effort against non-combatants, military, administrative and political authorities transformed the system from a potentially legitimate form of self-defense into a violation of international law. By seeking the elimination of the Tutsi, the authorities transformed the self-defense system into a weapon of genocide⁵⁸.

2.6. Killing of Tutsi between 1990 and 1994

Between 1990 and 1994, planned massacres of Tutsi were conducted across the country. From October 11th to 13th, 1990 in Kibilira, Tutsi were attacked by army and militia units resulting in the death of some 400 Tutsi. Five hundred homes were set on fire and 10,000 Tutsi were rounded up, imprisoned, and tortured. In 1991, from mid-January to mid-March, several hundred more Tutsi were murdered. These killings were supervised by the then Sous-Prefect of Ngororero, Bernard Niyitegeka.

⁵⁷Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide entourant mon arrestation le 18 juillet 1997 à Nairobi au Kenya, ma detention en Tanzanie, mon transfert aux Pays-Bas et mon procès en appel,* a document with 25 annexes, dated October 19, 1999 in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999)

⁵⁸Jean Kambanda, *Premier Ministre to Monsieur le Préfet (Tous)*, "Directive du Premier Ministre aux Prefets pour l'Organisation de l'Auto-Défense Civile," no. 024/02.3, May 25, 1994 and Edouard Karemera, *Ministre de l'Intérieur et du Développement Communal, to Monsieur le Préfet (Tous)*, May 25, 1994 ; Jean Kambanda, "Les Circonstances

In March 1991, 277 Tutsi were killed across communes of Ruhengeri Prefecture among which Nkuli, Kinigi and Mukingo. Killings were also conducted in Gisenyi Prefecture, across the communes of Gaseke, Giciye, Karago, Mutura, Kanama and Rwerere).

On the night of March 4th to 5th 1992, more than 500 Tutsi were massacred in the region of Bugesera. Tutsi were also massacred in 1992 and 1993 in the former commune of Mbogo (in current Rulindo District).

Not only Tutsi were targeted - President Habyarimana's government also targeted whoever would stand against the genocidal plan. It is in this spirit that in the region of Bugesera, an Italian nun, Antonia Locatelli, who led a technical teaching school (CERAI) in Nyamata, was killed on the night of March 9th to 10th 1992 because she had held an interview with RFI in which she explained the targeted killings of Tutsi that were being conducted in Bugesera by the government.

The Bugesera region was known for being inhabited by a large number of Tutsi who had been sent to the region during the early 1960s.

The genocidal government would refer to this region as a recruitment place for the RPF-Inkotanyi, which they accused of mobilizing young Tutsi from the region and taking them to their camps in Burundi. This region was also known as a PL (Parti Liberal) stronghold. These considerations were deemed to be sufficient grounds for the extermination of the Tutsi population.

2.7. Resistance to the peace process

President Habyarimana and the RPF-Inkotanyi signed the first protocol of the Arusha Accords in August 1992. Just a month after the acceptance of the first protocol, the commander-in-chief of the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees Rwandaises), General Deogratias Nsabimana, warned the men under his command that the enemy still intended to seize power and would do so at any time and at any price. Stressing that they should not trust negotiations and that they must truly "understand the kind of enemy" they had to fight, he circulated a report from a military commission that had identified ways to defeat the enemy.

In a note dated September 21st, 1992, the Rwandan Armed Forces described the state enemy as "...the Tutsi from inside or outside, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have never recognized and does not yet recognize the realities of the Social Revolution of 1959 and who want to reconquer power in Rwanda through all means, including weapons."

Although a ceasefire was in effect in July 1992, Lt Col Nsengiyumva Anatole, the then head of military intelligence, wrote to the Chief of Staff (sending a copy to the President of the Republic) about the consequences of possible RPF-Inkotanyi advances. He reported that in the event of an RPF advance, the military would kill the political leaders responsible for the concessions made to the RPF. He said that the people would rise up to kill the Tutsi before they fled the country.⁵⁹

2.8. Awareness of the International Community

As early as 1993, the international community was informed of a potential genocide in Rwanda.

There were many ethnic massacres of Tutsi between 1990-1994; these are a few:

- Massacres of Tutsis in Ngororero in 1990
- Massacres of Tutsis in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba, Kibungo in 1991
- Massacres of Tutsis in Bugesera and in Kibuye in 1992
- Massacres of Tutsis in Rural Kigali and in Shyorongi between 1992-1993
- Intensification of Massacres of Tutsis in Ruhengeri, Gisenyi in 1993
- Massacres of Tutsi students in Mudende in 1993
- Massacres of Tutsis from 1990 to 1993 in Murambi

2.8.1. Reports from Human Rights Organizations

Between January 7th and 21st, 1993, a delegation of international experts on a mission with the International Federation for Human Rights including Jean Carbonare (France), Dr Philippe Dahinden (Sweden), Prof. René Degni-Segui (Ivory Coast), Me Eric Gillet (Belgium), Dr Alison des Forges (USA), Dr Pol Dodinval (Belgium), Rein Odink (Netherlands), Halidou Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso), André Paradis (Canada), and Prof. William Schabas (Canada) conducted an investigation on killings in Rwanda happening at the time⁶⁰.

After arriving back in France on January 24th, 1993, the head of the delegation, Jean Carbonare, was invited to the state-owned television channel (France2). On France2 she declared that in Rwanda, during the three weeks spent conducting investigations into the massacres that were carried out there, he found some of the mass graves into which the killed Tutsi were dumped.

⁵⁹ Melvern L. "Etat d'esprit des militaires et de la population civile, ICTR-98-41-T, 11.09.2002.

⁶⁰ CNLIG, *Rwanda 1991-1994 Planification et mise en œuvre de Génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda, 2021.*

Carbonare confirmed that there was evidence proving that there were genocidal plans to exterminate the Tutsi, and that those involved in that plan were top leaders. He said it was spearheaded by President Juvénal Habyarimana himself and his wife Agathe Kanziga.

In the same year, in a report dated August 11th, 1993, Bacre Wally Ndiaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Executions, conducted a mission to Rwanda and reported massacres against the Tutsi – but the UN did nothing about it⁶¹.

2.8.2. Reports from the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda - UNAMIR

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 872 on October 5th, 1993, with the mandate to assist in implementing the Arusha Accords, signed on August 4th, 1993, to end the Rwandan civil war. The UNAMIR mission lasted from October 1993 to March 1996. It received significant attention for its role in failing to prevent the Genocide against the Tutsi due to the limitations around its rules of engagement.

A January 11th 1994 telegram from General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeeping force to his superiors was one clear warning of the massive slaughter being prepared in Rwanda. From November 1993 to April 1994, there were dozens of other signals, including an early December letter to Dallaire from high-ranking military officers warning of planned massacres; a press release by a bishop declaring that guns were being distributed to civilians; reports by intelligence agents of secret meetings to coordinate attacks on Tutsi, opponents of Hutu Power and UN peacekeepers; and public incitation to murder in the press and on the radio. Foreign observers did not track every indicator, but representatives of Belgium, France, and the U.S. were well-informed about most of them. In January, an analyst from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency knew enough to predict that as many as half a million people might die in the case of renewed conflict and, in February, Belgian authorities already feared a genocide. France, the power most closely linked to President Habyarimana, presumably knew at least as much as the other two⁶².

The U.S. may have been the only government to caution its officials in writing to avoid the word “genocide”, but diplomats and politicians from other countries and UN staff also shunned the term.

⁶¹B.W Ndiaye, *Report on Mission to Rwanda from April 8th to 17th 1993*, UN, 1993.

⁶² Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Some may have done so in an attempt to remain neutral, but others surely avoided the word because of the moral and legal imperatives attached to it.

Instead of denouncing the evil and explaining to the public what had to be done to end it, national and international leaders stressed the “confusing” nature of the situation, highlighting the “chaos” and the “anarchy”. After a first resolution was clear about the conflict, the Security Council issued statements for several weeks that left both the nature of the violence and the identity of its perpetrators unclear. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke of the genocide as if it were a natural disaster and depicted Rwandans as a people “fallen into calamitous circumstances”⁶³..

René Degni-Ségui, the then Special Rapporteur of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), observed, in a 1994 report submitted while the Genocide against Tutsi raged, that “impunity...is a recurrent cause of the massacres⁶⁴”. Degni-Ségui had remarked that political party militias, the armed forces and local authorities not only did not intervene in the atrocities but actually participated personally in the arbitrary arrest and execution of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Degni-Ségui further stated:

“No legal steps have been taken against those responsible for the earliest and present massacres although the public and the authorities know them. On the contrary, they continue to live quietly and move about freely, quite undisturbed and with complete impunity. Worse, still, many local officials who particularly distinguished themselves by their acts of cruelty have been promoted, whereas those who managed to keep the peace and prevent massacres were quite simply dismissed⁶⁵.”

⁶³ *Idem*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

⁶⁴ UN special Rapporteur Report quoted by Kaufman in Gasanabo, Simon and Ensign.

⁶⁵*ibid*.

CHAPTER 3

EXECUTION OF THE GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI

On April 6th, 1994, the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and his counterpart from Burundi was shot down on its approach to the Kanombe International Airport, triggering the Genocide against the Tutsi that had been long planned for.

On the night of April 6th to 7th, 1994, after the downing of the plane carrying Habyarimana, the Interahamwe and Habyarimana's presidential guard immediately began to set up roadblocks in Kigali city and killing Tutsi. The killings were coordinated by the state administration (Ministers, Prefects, Burgomasters, Municipal councilors), the army and the gendarmerie in an effort to kill politicians who did not support Habyarimana's government and the genocide plot.

On April 7th, 1994, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was killed along with 10 Belgian soldiers from the UN contingent who were assigned to protect her. Key opposition figures were also killed on this day, including the President of the Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda, and Ministers Frederic Nzamurambaho, president of the PSD party, Félicien Ngango, Vice President of the PSD party and his wife Odette Ubonabenshi, Faustin Rucogoza, the former Minister of Information and member of the non-extremist faction of the MDR party, as well as Landouard Ndasingwa from the PL party.

On April 7th, the Tutsi massacres also started in Nyamata, Bugesera and Sake, in Kibungo Prefecture and many other parts of the country.

On April 9th, 1994, an interim government was established in Kigali with Dr Théodore Sindikubwabo as President and Jean Kambanda as Prime Minister. All cabinet members, in collaboration with Prefects and Burgomasters, encouraged the Hutu to exterminate all the Tutsi - and any Hutu who opposed the genocidal plan. The execution of the genocide lasted for three months starting from April 7th, 1994 to July 15th, 1994 when it was put to an end by RPF-Inkotanyi soldiers.

1. The international recognition of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi

Following the end of the Genocide, various international reports paved the way for recognition of the Genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda and at the international level.

On August 12th, 1994, a report on the human rights situation in Rwanda submitted by Mr. René Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, confirmed the Genocide, saying, “various elements constituting genocide appear to be increasingly confirmed by the on-the-spot investigation that has been carried out. Such elements included the discovery of mass graves, the existence of evidence and proof indicating that the massacre of the Tutsi was planned and the identification of those primarily responsible.”

Based on this report, the UN Security Council established the **International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)** via Resolution 955 on **November 8th, 1994**. The ICTR was determined to be headquartered in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. This court tried some of the key masterminds of the Genocide against the Tutsi including then Prime Minister Jean Kambanda who pleaded guilty to the crimes of genocide and intent to exterminate. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Other key figures included Col. Théoneste Bagosora (who stated that he was going to organize the apocalypse) and Father Athanase Seromba (who ordered the killings of Tutsi in Nyange Parish church by destroying the church where the Tutsi had sought refuge).

Since April 7th, 2004, the UN General Assembly has recognized the atrocities committed in Rwanda as an “International Day of Reflection on the Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda”.

On January 26th, 2018, the UN General Assembly designated April 7th as the “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi”.

On April 21st, 2020, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution /A/RES/74/273 stating that April 7th is the “International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda”. Every year on this date, the international community officially reflects on the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

On September 20th, 2023 the UNESCO World Heritage Committee approved the inclusion of four memorials of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi on the World Heritage List. These include the Genocide Memorials in Kigali, Murambi, Bisesero and Nyamata. This recognition is a call to all nations to preserve this memory for the prevention of future genocide and atrocities committed against humanity.

2. The international community's responsibility

2.1. France

For close to four years, the French government sent guns, money and soldiers to help defend President Habyarimana's repressive regime that barbarically and publicly massacred the Tutsi. French troops, officials and diplomats witnessed and learned of the commonplace brutalization and dehumanization of the Tutsi. They saw it in the media, at roadblocks, in arbitrary detentions, in the torture of arrested persons and in the massacres. Yet Paris did nothing to change its policy. French leaders sought to maintain influence in East Africa and demonstrate to vital allies throughout the continent that France could be trusted to defend them against military threats to their power. But the cost to the French would rise precipitously. The effect of the French presence in Rwanda and its conscious indifference to the suffering created a sense of impunity amongst the perpetrators that would grow and find completion in the Genocide⁶⁶.

From 1990 to 1994, the French army was present in Rwanda's territory. Their presence was under bilateral cooperation agreements between the two countries for the training, initially of the Rwandan gendarmerie (1975-1994), but also subsequently for the training of the Rwandan armed forces (1990-1994). Unofficially added to their mandate was the clandestine training of civilians from 1992, and also clandestine operations in the country before and during the 1994 Genocide of the Tutsi.

During this period the following military operations were organized by the French army in Rwanda:

- » **Operation Noroit** from October 1990 to December 1993.
- » Military Assistance and Training Detachment "**DAMI-Panda**" from March 1991 to December 1993.
- » **Operations Volcans et Chimère** of February 1993.
- » **Operation Amaryllis** from April 8th to April 14th, 1994 in order to evacuate French and foreign nationals following the April 6th, 1994 plane crash of President Juvénal Habyarimana which ignited the genocide plan against the Tutsi.
- » **The Operation Insecticide** led by Gendarmerie Captain Paul Barril (under contract with the Rwandan army) from May to June 1994.
- » **Operation Turquoise** from June 22nd to August 22nd, 1994⁶⁷.

⁶⁶*ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Idem, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.*

2.2. Belgium

Belgians played an important diplomatic role in Rwanda in the years leading up to the Genocide. When UNAMIR was created in October 1993, Belgian troops, to the great credit of their government, constituted the largest Western contingent.

In the months that followed, reacting to a flood of warnings of an imminent massacre, Belgium pressed the UN to grant greater freedom of action and a broader mandate to UNAMIR. The UN refused to adopt any measures that would result in increased costs or risks. The day after the crash of President Habyarimana's plane, 10 Belgian peacekeepers guarding the then Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana were murdered by government soldiers, exactly as Dallaire's informant had said three months earlier. In fact, the 1996 Belgian parliamentary commission investigating the country's role in the Genocide discovered that the Belgian government knew a lot in advance about the risks of genocide, including the risks faced by its contingent to the UN.

Following these killings, the peacekeeping troops received orders to leave Rwanda. Regardless of the tension that had built up as Interahamwe surrounded ETO Kicukiro, the UN troops there also decided to leave on April 11th, 1994. Their departure was simultaneous with the entry of Interahamwe militia and genocidal government soldiers. On April 14th, 1994, when Foreign Minister Willy Claes told UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that Brussels intended to withdraw its peacekeepers and encourage other countries to do the same, there were no objections in Belgium to the decision that effectively stranded Rwanda with its executioners.

DENIAL OF GENOCIDE AGAINST TUTSI

The Genocide against the Tutsi began with an ideology of hatred, segregation, division and violence. It was taught, disseminated and publicly instilled as identity groups that were pitted against others with a view to their extermination. This genocidal ideology was disseminated through discriminatory political speeches and broadcast through media, political bodies, religious bodies and more. It is this ideology that jurists call the intention to commit genocide which distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity.

The ideology that spread hatred against the Tutsi in Rwanda was transmitted before the Genocide to incite people to mobilize, during the perpetration of the Genocide to encourage the killers to participate massively in the crime and after the perpetration of the Genocide to deny the facts, to distort its reality, and to distort its specificity.

In the case of Rwanda, denial of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi is to assert that the Genocide did not occur. This denial rejects the researched and proven facts that Tutsi were the victims of genocide between April 7th, and July 15th, 1994. "With contempt for factual evidence the perpetrators of this genocide have tried to alter the story, diminishing the death too, claiming the killing was a self-defense, and blaming the victims."⁶⁸

Organized Genocide denial started before 1994, to cover up its preparation. This continued after the Genocide. Three forms of collective denial⁶⁹ have been documented as follows: literal denial, interpretative denial, and implicatory denial.

a. Literal denial – “No genocide happened”

Literal genocide denial claims that no genocide took place. These deniers systematically negate the facts of the Genocide and keep silent about genocidal plans and killings. Within and outside Rwanda, literal denial was widespread among leaders and followers of the Hutu Power regime. Governments represented in the UN Security Council who had the responsibility to act avoided using the word genocide, and this literal denial was enabled by their deliberate choice not to get involved.

⁶⁸ Linda Melvern, *Intent to Deceive: Denying the Genocide of the Tutsi*, London, Verso Books, 2020.

⁶⁹ By Dr Helen Hintjens and Jos van Oijen, *Elementary forms of collective denial: The 1994 Rwanda Genocide*, in *Genocide Studies International (International Institute of Social Studies)*, 2020.

Even before the Genocide ended, literal genocide denial began in Europe, spread by groups with close ties to genocidaires before 1994.

These groups included the French government and the White Fathers, Catholic missionaries from Belgium. Leaders and followers of the Hutu Power regime, both within and outside of Rwanda, were also involved in spreading literal denial of the Genocide.

Some Examples:

- During the ICTR trial of Col. Bagosora Théoneste⁷⁰, one of the masterminds of the Genocide against the Tutsi, Peter Erlinder told the judges that a genocide couldn't have been able to happen in Rwanda as it did not have the needed logistics and communication systems to mobilize the whole citizenry into mass killings.
- When testifying at the ICTR on February 5th, 2001, Twagiramungu Faustin (former Prime Minister 1994-1995) spoke in the defense of Elizaphan Ntakirutinka and his son who were convicted of genocide: "The people who were killed had no color. They were black Rwandans. The intention was not to kill Tutsi, but Rwandans belonging to the opposition: Hutu and Tutsi. People did not sit down to establish an emergency plan, phases of a master plan to kill the Tutsi. The genocide in Rwanda in no way means that it was the Tutsi who were killed. It is here where we suffer the most and where we continue to suffer. When the genocide means that only the Tutsi were killed, I cannot accept it⁷¹."
- In a 1995 interview with the BBC, Jean-Christophe Mitterand (son of the former French President François Mitterrand and head of the Africa desk in the office of the French President in 1994) said, when asked if he thought there was a genocidal plan: "I can't imagine him, I can't imagine him knowing about Africa and Rwanda. It requires an organization that I don't see in the state - I was going to say of their technology - of their communication, which didn't really exist or very poorly. There could be organizations that were created on their own, but there was no order at the top⁷²."

⁷⁰ CASE NO. ICTR-98-41-T *The Prosecutor of the ICTR vs Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze, Anatole Nsengiyumva*, 30 May 2007.

⁷¹ ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T *The Prosecutor of the ICTR against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana*.

⁷² "The Bloody Tricolor" *Panorama*, BBC, August 28th 1995, <https://francegenocidetutsi.org/RwandaPanoramaBloodyTricolour.mp4>.

b. Interpretative denial – “There were killings but no genocide”

Interpretative genocide denial is a mutational form of denial which occurs after factual proof from historical records and testimonies have been established and proven beyond doubt. It means that the massacres and killings are acknowledged as something other than genocide. Deniers of the Genocide against the Tutsi twist facts with the intent to deny that the killings constituted genocide, highlighting other crimes committed around the same time or afterwards that were not classified as genocide in order to relativize genocide.

This approach was promoted through the mainstream international media based on tales of seemingly two-sided tribal and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. From interpretative deniers, the killings were justified as self-defense, part of civil war or ethnic self-determination of the “majority” population (the Hutu). In this way, deniers minimize the Genocide against the Tutsi to no more than “blood-letting” or ethnic conflict.

A popular form of interpretative denial implies that the Tutsi were responsible for the Genocide and killings conducted against them because they first waged war against the Hutu majority, and then were massacred in retaliation. Genocide deniers claim that Hutu soldiers and citizen defense militia had no choice but to defend themselves against an invading Tutsi rebel army. In this way, a deliberate campaign of extermination of up to a million unarmed citizens is rationalized by portraying victims as casualties of civil war, a war supposedly caused by victims themselves.

By portraying selective slaughter as self-defense, or part of civil war and ethnic self-determination by the ‘majority’ population, interpretative denial conveniently reworks the facts of genocide as something else. Interpretative denial narratives suggest that someone else was responsible for the killings - not Hutu Power organizers or the Rwandan state, but the victims took the blame.

Examples:

- » The French authorities have never stopped preaching double genocide. As early as April 13th, 1994, Admiral Lanxade, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, declared during a restricted council, “Now, it is the Tutsi who will massacre the Hutu in Kigali”. A few weeks later, Operation Turquoise’s June 22nd, 1994 order indicated: “Although the situation is less well known in its area, it seems that the RPF also engaged in summary executions and actions.” and “purification” against the Hutu⁷³”.

⁷³ ICTR-96-10-T & ICTR-96-17-T *The Prosecutor of the ICTR against Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana.*

- » This accusation was repeated by Alain Juppé, writing on June 16th, 1994 in *Libération*: “France [...] demands that those responsible for these genocides be judged.” In November 1994, President François Mitterrand spoke of the Rwandan genocides in a written version of his speech at the Franco-African summit in Biarritz⁷⁴.

For perpetrators and their allies, this reinterpretation of the Genocide allows them to maintain a positive self-image.

- » In a November 2020 article published in *The Mail & Guardian* by Judi Rever and Benedict Moran entitled “Exclusive: Top-secret testimonies implicate Rwanda’s president in war crime”, the RPF-Inkotanyi is accused of having undertaken massacres and committed genocide against the Hutu⁷⁵. A known Genocide denier and revisionist, Judi Rever claimed that the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was secretly planned, ignited and fueled by the RPF to generate international support and sympathy in its plan to seize power in Rwanda. In the same article, the RPF was accused of planning a genocide of Hutu and slaughtering and demonizing the Hutu majority from Rwanda into the DRC.

c. Implicatory denial – “Yes genocide happened, but other similar killings also took place”

Implicatory genocide denial acknowledges that genocide took place but involves explicit counter-accusations to blame the “other side”. In Rwanda, implicatory denial involved conspiracy theories that preceded the Genocide that were later revised and expanded upon.

In the early 1990s Hutu Power media claimed that the Tutsi intended to wipe out the Hutu majority. This fearmongering was intended to justify the creation of so-called self-defense militias, really death squads, like the notorious Interahamwe, who in 1994 were deployed to kill Tutsi in their homes, at roadblocks, even in schools, hospitals and places of worship.

The theory of “double genocide” is a form of collective genocide denial bridging interpretative and implicatory genocide denial. The double genocide thesis suggests the Hutu were themselves victims of a genocide perpetrated by the Tutsi-dominated RPF-Inkotanyi. After the Genocide against the Tutsi, this theory was used to suggest moral equivalence. It was claimed all sides were equally guilty of heinous war crimes.

⁷⁴Conférence de presse, Biarritz, 9 novembre 1994, Rwanda. *Les archives secrètes de Mitterrand (1982-1995)*, op. cit., p. 736.

⁷⁵Judi Rever & Benedict Moran, “Exclusive: Top-secret testimonies implicate Rwanda’s president in war crime”, *The Mail & Guardian*, 29/11/2020.

- » More recently throughout circles of deniers, the narrative has evolved into claiming that the RPF-Inkotanyi somehow masterminded the Genocide against the Tutsi, not the Hutu Power elite and the government.

Examples:

- » In the book "Enquêtes sur un attentat. Rwanda, 6 Avril 1994", Charles Onana said the RPF-Inkotanyi was said to have committed crimes against the Hutu comparable to those committed against the Tutsi; he affirmed that the RPF should be held responsible for the destabilization of the Great Lakes region and that there had not been any genocide conducted against the Tutsi by the Hutu Power led government in Rwanda in 1994.⁷⁶
- » In a more recent article (2023) published in the online journal Sahuti Africa, Charles Onana deepened his implicatory denial theories when he wrote about the situation in the DRC saying, "The objective of these people (RPF led Rwanda) is not only to take a few territories in the east of the DRC. They ultimately want to impose at the head of the country, someone they will control in order to take control of the country. They are so determined. And the Congolese must be aware of this and prepare accordingly⁷⁷."
- » Twagiramungu Faustin (former first Prime Minister in post-genocide Government), posted on his Twitter account on July 12th, 2023, that 29 years have gone by since RPF dismissed the Arusha Peace Accords to start the genocide against the Hutu in Rwanda and later on in the DRC⁷⁸.
- » In an interview with RFI on September 1st, 2003, Dominique De Villepin, Chief of Staff for Alain Juppé in 1994, mentioned, "the terrible genocides which struck Rwanda". By this he implied there had been more than one genocide in Rwanda, spreading the denial ideology.

⁷⁶Raphael Doridant, *Charles Onana mis en examen, Survie*, 2022.

⁷⁷ *Sahuti Africa, RDC: « Si rien n'est fait, les Congolais risquent de perdre leur pays »* by Charles Onana, November 2023.

⁷⁸ <https://twitter.com/FTwagiramungu/status/1679023395906748454>

d. Summary of denial trends

Literal genocide denial is relatively easy to challenge with proven facts that have been researched and documented.

Implicatory genocide denial can be interpreted as “fake news”, as it suggests that “things are not what they seem to be”. Evidence is taken out of context or made up to “reveal” a secret conspiracy.

Interpretative and implicatory genocide denial are more difficult to challenge and fight since they are not about denying facts, but about reinterpreting what lies “behind” facts. They suggest that there are hidden truths behind the facts, often as with fake news, based on hearsay and unsubstantiated evidence.

More than 29 years after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, denial continues to persist and is on the rise, especially through intergenerational transmission of information.

CONCLUSION

The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was a planned execution and extermination conducted by the then Government of Rwanda with complacent support from some foreign countries.

The April 7th observance of the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi is a continued call to all UN Member States, organizations of the UN system and other relevant international organizations, as well as civil society organizations, to recommit to preventing and fighting against genocide and other serious crimes under international law. The remembrance underscores the importance of reflecting on the lessons learned from the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

Preserving historical memory is critically important for Rwanda. Education about the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi is part of Rwanda's commemoration to honor the memory of victims, to learn from past mistakes and to educate young and new generations.

The purpose of this booklet is to preserve the historical memory of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and to educate new generations. The Genocide is a part of our shared human history from which lessons must be learnt to prevent another genocide from occurring.

SOURCES AND REFERENCE MATERIALS

Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to murder, the Rwandan genocide*, London, 2004.

Linda Melvern, *Intent to Deceive: Denying the Genocide of the Tutsi*, London, Verso Books, 2020

Linda Melvern, *A people betrayed. The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*, Zed Books, 2000

Mugesera, A. (2014). *The Persecution of Rwandan Tutsi before the 1990-1994 Genocide*. Dialogue Editions, April, 2014, Kigali-Rwanda

Mugesera Antoine, *les conditions de vie des Tutsi avant 1990-1994*, Kigali, 2014

Kimonyo Jean Paul, *Rwanda: Un génocide populaire*, Karthala, 2008

Morel Jacques, *La France au cœur du génocide des Tutsi*, Izuba, 2011

Barnett Michael, *Eyewitness to a genocide : the United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2002.

Bizimana Jean Damascène, *Inzira ya Jenocide yakorewe Abatutsi*, Kigali, 2014

Bizimana Jean Damasène, *L'itinéraire du génocide commis contre les Tutsi*, Kigali, 2014

Bizimana Jean Damascène, *L'Eglise et le génocide au Rwanda : Les Pères Blancs et le négationnisme*, L'Harmattan, 2001

Josias Semujanga et Jean Luc Galabert (sous la direction), *Faire face au négationnisme du génocide des Tutsi*, Izuba, 2013

Patrick De Saint Exupéry, *L'Inavouable. La France au Rwanda*, Les Arènes, 2004

Patrick De Saint Exupéry, *Les complices de l'inavouable, La France au Rwanda*, Ls Arènes, 2009

Patrick De Saint Exupéry, *La Traversée*, Les Arènes, 2021

Timmermann, W. (2005). *The relationship between hate propaganda and Incitement to Genocide: A new trend in International Law towards criminalization of Hate propaganda*. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Volume 18, pp.257-282

KAYIHURA, *Inside the Hotel Rwanda*, BenBella Books, avril 2014

NISHIMWE Consolée, *Tested to the Limit: a Genocide survivor's story of pain resilience and hope*, Paperback, june 2012

STANTON, G. H. (2002). Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented? Retrieved March 16, 2016, from Genocide watch: <http://www.genocidewatch.org>

STANTON, G. H. (2013). 10 Stages of Genocide. Retrieved April 22, 2016, from Genocide watch net: <http://genocidewatch.net>

STAUB, Ervin, *Roots of Evil: The Origin of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

NDAHIRO Alfred, RUTAZIBWA Private, *Hotel Rwanda, the Tutsi Genocide as seen by Hollywood*, L'Harmattan, 2008

CAPLAN, Gerald, *The Politics of denialism: The strange case of Rwanda*. Review of Herman and Peterson's *The Politics of Genocide*, 2009. Retrieved from <http://links.org.au/node/1757>

Dr Helen Hintjens and Jos van Oijen, *Elementary forms of collective denial: The 1994 Rwanda Genocide*, in the International Institute of Social Studies, 6th July 2020, <https://www.iss.nl/en/news/elementary-forms-collective-denial-1994-rwanda-genocide>

Dallaire, Romeo and Beardsley, B. (2003). *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Ontario: Random House Canada; Gregory, H. Stanton (2009).

Destexhe, A. (1995). *Rwanda and Genocide in Century*. London: Pluto Press the Twentieth

Jean Chatain, *Nuit et brouillard sur le Rwanda*, Izuba Editions, 2019

Stephane Audouin Rouzeau, *Une initiation. Rwanda 1994-2016*, Seuil, 2017

Jean François Dupaquier (2010). *L'Agenda du génocide, le témoignage de Richard Mugenzi ex-espion Rwandais*, Editions Karthala.

Levy Firestone Muse, *A FORESEEABLE GENOCIDE: The Role of the French Government in Connection with the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda*, 19 April 2021

Longman, Timothy (1999). *State, Civil Society and Genocide in Rwanda*. In Joseph, R. (Ed). *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Mail

CHRETIEN, Jean-Pierre, *Le défi de l'ethnisme. Rwanda et Burundi : 1990-1996*, Paris, Karthala, 1997

CHRÉTIEN, Jean-Pierre et KABANDA, Marcel, *Rwanda. Racisme et génocide. L'idéologie hamitique*, Paris, Belin, 2013.

CHRETIEN, J.P., DUPAQUIER, Jean-François, KABANDA, Marcel et NGARAMBE, Joseph, *Rwanda. Le médias du génocide*, Paris, Karthala, 1995

CHRETIEN, J.P. et KABANDA Marcel, L'idéologie hamitique et le génocide, 2013

Nsegimana Albert, My Mother Killed me: Surviving Rwanda's Tutsi genocide, Hugo & Compagnie, 2019.

Ilibagiza Immaculee, Left to tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust, Hay House 2014.

Sissi Dimitri M., Do not accept to die, Tredition, 2022

Daniel Nyamwasa, Le Mal rwandais. De la racine au paroxysme du génocide des Tutsi, Izuba, 2017

Hélène Dumas, Sans ciel ni terre. Paroles orphelines du génocide des Tutsi 1994-2006, La Découverte, 2020

DUMAS Hélène, Le génocide au village, Paris, Seuil, « L'université historique », 2014

GOUREVITCH Philip, Nous avons le plaisir de vous informer que, demain, nous serons tués avec nos familles. Chroniques rwandaises, Denoël, 1999, 398 p.

GOUTEUX, Jean-Paul, La Nuit rwandaise, Paris : Editions Izuba/Esprit Frappeur, 2002

KAYIMAHE Vénuste, La chanson de l'aube, IZUBA mars 2014

KAYIMAHE Venuste, France-Rwanda : les coulisses du génocide. Témoignage d'un rescapé, Dagorno-L'esprit frappeur, 2002, 359 p.

MALAGARDIS Maria et SANNER Pierre-Laurent, Rwanda le jour d'après, Récits et témoignages au lendemain du génocide, Somogy, 1995

MUJAWAYO Esther et BELHADDAD Souâd, SurVivantes, La Tour d'Aigue, L'Aube, 2004

MUKAMUGEMA Eugénie, Une vie au Rwanda, parmi tant d'autres, Collection Izuba, mars 2015, 276p

MUKANTABANA Adélaïde, L'innommable Agahomamunwa - Un récit du génocide des Tutsi, L'Harmattan, janvier 2016

MUKASONGA Scholastique, Inyenzi ou les cafards, collection Continents noirs, Gallimard, 2006

MUKASONGA Scholastique, La femme aux pieds nus, collection Continents noirs, Gallimard, 2008

MUKASONGA Scholastique, L'iguifou, nouvelles rwandaises, collection Continents noirs, Gallimard, 2010

MUKASONGA Scholastique, Notre Dame du Nil, collection Continents noirs, Gallimard, 2012

MUKASONGA Scholastique, Cœur tambour, collection Blanche, Gallimard, 2016

MUKAGASANA Yolande et MAY Patrick, La mort ne veut pas de moi. Document. Paris, Fixot, 1997

MUKAGASANA Yolande et MAY Patrick, N'aie pas peur de savoir. Rwanda : un million de morts. Une rescapée raconte, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1999.

MUKAGASANA Yolande et KAZINIERAKIS Alain, Les blessures du silence. Témoignages du génocide au Rwanda, Arles/Paris, Actes Sud/Médecins sans frontières, 2001.

MURANGIRA César, Un Sachet d'Hosties pour Cinq, Éditions Amalthé, 2016

MUZIMA Philibert, Imbibé de leur sang, gravé de leurs noms, Izuba Editions, avril 2016

KAYITARE Pauline, Tu leur diras que tu es Hutue, GRIP - André Versaille éditeur, 2011

KAYITESI Annick, Nous existons encore, Michel Lafon, octobre 2004

RURANGWA Revérien, Génocidé, Presses De La Renaissance 2006

SEMUJANGA Josias, Récits fondateurs du drame rwandais, l'Harmattan, 1999

MAS Monique, Paris Kigali 1990-1994, Lunettes coloniales, politique du sabre et onction humanitaire, pour un génocide en Afrique, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999

CNLG, Rwanda: 1991-1994, Preparation and execution of genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda, January 2021, <https://www.minubumwe.gov.rw/>

Republic of Rwanda, NURC. Unity and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda, December 2016

Republic of Rwanda, NURC, from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century, 2016.

Republic of Rwanda, NURC, from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century, 2016. <https://www.minubumwe.gov.rw/index>.

République du Rwanda, Comité Indépendant d'experts chargé de l'enquête sur le crash du 06/04/1994 de l'avion Falcon 50 Immatricule 9xr-Nn. Rapport d'enquête sur les causes, les circonstances et les responsabilités de l'attentat du 06/04/1994 contre l'avion Présidentiel Rwandais Falcon 50 N° 9xr-Nn, <https://www.minubumwe.gov.rw/index>.

République Du Rwanda, Rapport De La Commission Nationale Indépendante Chargée De Rassembler Les Preuves Montrant L'implication De L'état Français Dans Le Génocide Perpétré Au Rwanda En 1994, Novembre 2007. <https://www.minubumwe.gov.rw/index>

République Française, Commission De Recherche Sur Les Archives Françaises Relatives Au Rwanda : La France, le Rwanda et le génocide des Tutsi (1990-1994). Rapport remis au Président de la République le 26 Mars 2021

Rutembesa, Faustin (2001). « Ruptures culturelles et génocide au Rwanda » In Cahiers du Centre de Gestion des Conflits, n°2, Butare, E.U.N.R., Avril, pp. 93-123.

Rwanda Carrefour d'Afrique, No 31 Mars 1964

Shyaka, Anastase (2007). The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development and Exit Strategies. Kigali: SIDA

Vansina (2001). Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, New York, University of Wisconsin Press, p.168; Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forests, Water and Mines (2004).

DOCUMENTARY FILMS

Nick Hughes & Eric Kabera, 100 days, 2001

Eric Kabera, Keepers of memories, 2004

Raoul Peck, sometimes in April, 2005

Michael Caton-Jones, Shooting Dogs, 2016

Roger Spottiswoode, Shake hands with the devil, 2007

Roger Spottiswoode, J'ai serré la main du diable

Anne Aghion, My neighbor My killer, 2009

Richard Mulindwa, 94 Terror

Lee Isaac Chung, Munyurangabo, 2008

Christophe Klotz, Kigali : Des images contre un massacre

Jean Christophe Klotz, Retour à Kigali, 2020

Anne Lainé, Un cri d'un silence inouï, 2001

Luc De Heusch, Rwanda : Une République devenue folle (1894-1994), 1996

Raphaël Glucksmann, David Hazan et Pierre Mezerette, Tuez-les tous ! (Rwanda : Histoire d'un génocide « sans importance »), 2004.

Gaël Faye et Michael Sztanke, Rwanda : le silence des mots, 2022

Michael Sztanke, Rwanda, chronique d'un génocide annoncé, 2019

André Versaille, Rwanda, un génocide en héritage, 2020

Léandre-Alain Baker : « Yolande ou les blessures du silence », 2016

Mehdi Bâ et Jérôme Frey, 7 jours à Kigali, 2016

Léopold Gasigwa, Izingiro ry'amahoro, 2016


Alexandre Westphal, Violaine Baraduc, A mots couverts, 2016

Catherine Lorisgnol, Rwanda, une intoxication française, 2016

Karirima Ngarambe Aimable, « 20 ans plus tard », 2016

Venuste Kayimahe, Rwanda, récit d'un survivant: Devoir de survivant, devoir de mémoire, 2016

Marie Violaine Brincard, Au nom du Père, de Tous, du Ciel, 2012



f X @

#KWIBUKA30

WWW.KWIBUKA.RW